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m some manner or bears some relation to its
eJJforcemcnt.
Co. v. Sttperior Court, 24
632 [130 P.2cl 881]; VVill?.ams v.
Conrt,
Cal.2cl
666
P.2d 334] ; .McCord Co. v. Plotnick,
104 Cal.App.2d
496
P.2d 880] .) 'l'he trial court,
in
the
corrections, apparently treated the
motion as a request for correction of the transcript under
le 8 of the Hules on
In an analogous situation,
where the trial court denied a motion to amend a reporter's
transcript by striking out certain words in the answer of a
witness and inserting others, it 1vas held that the order was
not
as a special order after final judgment since
it dicl not affect the judgment or its enforeement. (McCord
Co. v.
104 Cal.App.2d 495, 496 [231 P.2d 880] .)
Similarly, in Cross v. Tustin, 37 Cal.2d 821, 825-826 [236
P.2d
, orders denying motions to vaeate and amend a
settled statement of oral proceedings were held nonappealable.
[4] It is elear that no appeal lies from the order under eonsideration here. If, however, the record is defieient in any
respect, defendant may app1y to the Distriet Court of Appeal
for augmentation under rule 12 of the Rules on Appeal.
rrhe appeal is dismissed.
Shenk, .J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Sehauer, ,J., eoncurred.

[Crim. No. 5722.

In Bank.

JulyS, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MARY PENNY,
Appellant.
Homicide-Evidence-Cause of Death.-In prosecution of face
rejuvenator for manslaughter, evidence that phenol was found
in liver and blood of victim and opinions of physician and
autopsy surgeon that solution used on victim's face and neck
contained phenol in excess of 10 per cent are sufficient to
show that victim died of phenol poisoning.
[2] Criminal Law-Evidence-Expert Testimony.-In prosecution
of face rejuvenator for manslaughter, it is not error to admit
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 289 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 798 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 156; [2] Criminal Law,
§ 555(8); [3] Criminal Law, § 556; [4] Criminal Law, § 658(6);
[5, 6] Homicide, § 174; [7] Criminal Law, § 637; [8] Homicide,
§§ 25, 26; [9] Homicide, § 26; [10] Homicide,§ 27.
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that she had no license from either the Cosmetology Board
or the Medical Board of this state ; she did have a business
license from the city of Los
for the business of "Face
Rejuvenation.''
Defendant had a year's training with a Madame Bergeron
(now deceased) in Los Angeles and approximately three
months' training with one Geraldine Gorman in New York.
In New York, she received the formula which she used in her
work. The formula consisted of one ounce of
a heaping
tablespoon of resorcinol (of the same chemical group) and
16 drops of phenol (carbolic acid).
Kay Stanley, the victim, had consulted with defendant
some seven months earlier about having her face treated to
remove wrinkles and pock marks, but did not have the money
to do it at that time. Around Easter time of 1953, she again
asked defendant to treat her face, but defendant was to be
away and could not do it then. On the morning of May 4,
1953, Kay Stanley arrived at about 10 in the morning at
defendant's home where she -vvas to
during the treatment.
Kay's face was first washed with warm ·water and soda;
the formula was then applied with a cotton wrapped wooden
applicator to Kay's cheeks, a square inch at a time. After
each application, the area was pressed with sterile gauze to
remove excess moisture. The entire forehead was covered as
well as the eyelids, the process
about two hours. The
treated area was then covered with gauze and taped with
small pieces of tape which overlapped and covered the area;
regular waterproof adhesive tape was then put on over the
other tape; this formed a mask over the upper portion of
the patient's face. After the taping had been completed, Kay
walked to an adjoining room where she had lunch, listened
to the radio and looked at magazines. At approximately 6
in the evening, defendant proceeded to treat the lower half
of Kay's face in the same manner as she had treated the
upper portion which took about three quarters of an hour.
When the treatment was completed, Kay asked defendant if
she could sit up for awhile before the taping was started;
she sounded sleepy. The defendant told her she could and
said she would get her a glass of water. ·when defendant returned with the water, Kay said, "I feel a little bit faint"
and lay back as though in a faint. Defendant asked her how
she felt but received no answer. When defendant tried to
lift her she found she was dead weight and felt that she had
fainted. Defendant tried unsuccessfully to call a Dr. Wallace
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and left a message for him; she then called a nurse-anaesthetist
who arrived at the house about 10 or 15 minutes later. Mrs.
Jevne, the nurse, tried to take the patient's pulse without
success; there was no respiration. She then administered
Coramine, a heart stimulant by hypodermic needle, in the
arm; she then gave a hypodermic injection of Metrazol, another stimulant; she then tried artificial respiration and
caffeine benzoate. She told defendant to call the doctor again.
Dr. Wallace arrived about an hour after Mrs. Jevne did and
examined the lady whom he found lying on the treatment
table. He was able to feel no pulse and there was no respiration. He noticed signs indicating death had existed for
some period of time.
Defendant called her attorney who called the police.
The finding, after an autopsy had been had, was that the
immediate cause of death was phenol (carbolic acid) poisoning
and edema of the glottis due to ''application of phenolcontaining mixture to the face and neck." Other findings
were that 5.1 milligrams of phenol per 100 grams were found
in the liver and 2.9 milligrams of phenol per 100 grams were
found in the blood of the victim. It was the opinion of Dr.
Newbarr, prosecution witness and chief autopsy surgeon for
the Los .Angeles coroner's office, that these findings were
the result of the application of a solution containing more
than 10 per cent phenol to the face and neck of the victim.
It was the opinion of Mr . .Abernathy, the toxicologist, that
the reddish-brown discoloration of the victim's face was a
third degree burn caused by phenol, and that the normal
finding of phenol in a normal human being would be practically zero.
There was evidence in the record which showed that the
victim had been taking reducing pills prescribed by a Texas
doctor; that in order to obtain replacement of the pills, it
was necessary for her to have her heart examined and blood
pressure taken by a local doctor ; that prior to going to the
defendant's home for the face rejuvenation treatment she
had had her heart and pulse examined and her blood pressure
taken and that all findings were normal.
[1] The defendant testified that when she first received
the formula for face rejuvenation she had it analyzed and
that it contained only 3.1 per cent phenol. The defense also
took the position that the victim may have had an allergy
to phenol which was the cause of death. Dr. Newbarr testified
for the prosecution and gave, as his opinion, that the solution
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State Board
establishment other
than one licensed
1s
of a misdemeanor.
'"l'he art of
includes
arms, bust or upper
the use of cosmetic
lotions
creams.
"A violation of this law is an unlawful act not
to a
''Business & Professions
Seetion 7325
"Business & Professions Code, Section 7321 (b)
"
It is
that under these two instructions defendant
could have been convicted (1) if the jury believed she used
a solution containing more than 10 per cent phenol and had
a license; or (2) that she was
because she was required
to have a license and had none.
[5] There can be no doubt but that the instruction concerning a "licensed" cosmetologist was erroneous and that
it had no foundation in the evidence. On the issue of
defendant's guilt, the jury could well have inferred that
she was guilty of the crime by reasoning that even a lieensed
cosmetologist could not use a solution containing more than
10 per cent phenol. [6] So far as the second instruction is
concerned, it is supported by the evidence and correctly stated
the law as it relates to those practicing cosmetology and
the persons considered engaged in that practice. It appears
to us that as a matter of law, defendant was engaged in the
practice of cosmetology and the jury should have been so
instructed.
[7] We said in People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 897 [156
P.2d 7], that the responsibility of statutory construction
should not be left to the jury; that the interpretation of a
statute and the question of its applicability to any given set
of facts are exclusively the province of the court.
[8] The next question which presEmts itself is whether
defendant's laek of a lieense (and the fact that she was,
therefore, guilty of a misdemeanor) was the cause of 1\Irs.
Stanley's death. Section 192.2 of the Penal Code provides
that a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter if a
human being is unlawfully killed ''in the commission of an
unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; . . . " 'l'he jury
1vas instructed that defendant's conduct must have been the
proximate cause of the death. The People argue that the
law requiring licensing of those practicing cosmetology was
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uc''"<'•uc•u to prevent
to others and that one who violates
such a law may be guilty of manslaughter if death is caused
thereby,
People v. Mitchell, 27 Cal.2d 678, 683 [166
P.2d
. The Mitchell case involved section 500 of the
Vehicle Code which provided "When the death of any person
ensues within one year as the proximate rest~lt of injuries
caused
the
of any vehicle with reckless disregard .
. . . " and is not applicable here. Moreover, in the Mitchell
case it was specifically noted that the provisions of the Penal
Code ( § 192) defining involuntary manslaughter should not
apply to homicide caused by the driving of any vehicle. In
People v. J{errick, 86 Cal.App. 542, 548 [261 P. 756], a case
factually dissimilar to the one under consideration, the court
said: "\Ve cannot ignore the element of causation in the
unlawful act necessary to connect it with the offense. In our
ordinary phraseology we refer to the result of this element
by saying it must be the probable consequence naturally
flowing from the commission of the unlawful act.'' A causal
connection was also held essential in People v. Goodale, 33
Cal.App.2d 80, 83 [91 P.2d 163] ; People v. Httrley, 13 Cal.
App.2d 208 [56 P.2d 978], and People v. Frettdenberg, 121
Cal.App.2d 564 [263 P.2d 875]. It is extremely dubious
that defendant's lack of a license had any causal connection
with Mrs. Stanley's death and yet it should be noted that
the statute (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7415) provides that if a
licensed cosmetologist uses a solution of phenol greater than
10 per cent on any human being, he, or she, is guilty of a
misdemeanor. Had defendant been a licensed cosmetologist,
under the evidence she would have been guilty of a misdemeanor, and, as a result, the first clause of section 192.2
of the Penal Code would have been directly applicable.
[9] Another question which presents itself is whether
defendant was guilty of an unlawful act in applying a solution containing phenol and resorcinol to the human face and
neck with the knowledge that both chemicals were poisonous.
The statute providing that a licensed cosmetologist may not
use a solution containing greater than 10 per cent phenol
without being guilty of a misdemeanor sets the standard for
licensed persons in that profession or occupation. In discussing the violation of a criminal statute as a basis for a
suit for civil damages, we said in Clinkscales v. Carver, 22
Ca1.2d 72, 75 [136 P.2d 777], "When a legislative body has
generalized a standard from the experience of the community
and prohibits conduct that is likely to cause harm, the court
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jury could have concluded that her treatment was one which
could have caused death.
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'!'he jury was also instructed that "The doing of an act
ordinarily lawful which results in the death of a human
being Inay be manslaughter where the act, being one which
might cause death, is performed in an unlawful manner or
·without due caution and circumspection. When a person is
doing anything dangerous in itself or has charge of anything
dangerous in its use and acts with reference thereto without
taking those proper precautions which a person of ordinary
prudence would have used under the circumstances and the
death of another results therefrom, his act or neglect is a
criminal act against the person so killed.'' The People contend that these two instructions harmonize with the case of
People v. Pociask, 14 Cal.2d 679, 683-684 [96 P.2d 788].
The Pociask case involved a death resulting from a violation
of section 500 of the V chicle Code then in effect which referred to the driving of any vehicle in a "negligent manner."
The court there said in answering the question of what constitutes criminal negligence, that the court is bound to apply
an appropriate definition enacted by the Legislature and that
section 500 of the V chicle Code had made criminal the negligent driving of a vehicle which caused injuries to another
proximately resulting in death within the time specified in
the section.
While the last quoted instruction was substantially* that
which was used in People v. Wilson, 193 Cal. 512 [226 P. 5]
(an automobile case) and approved in the Pociask case, the
court specifically noted that what might ''amount to a lack
of 'due caution and circumspection' in cases of involuntary
manslaughter committed in the doing of a lawful act, or
what may constitute the driving of a vehicle 'in a negligent
manner,' are questions to be decided by the jury according
to the particular facts in each case guided by appropriate
instructions from the court.''
Defendant relies on the rules set forth in People v. Driggs,
supra, 111 Cal.App. 42, and People v. Hurley, supra, 13
Cal.App.2d 208, wherein the rule was said to be: "In order
to constitute criminal negligence, there must enter into the
act some measure of wantonness or :flagrant or reckless disregard of the safety of others, or wilful indifference. If no
one of these elements enters into the act, the person charged
cannot be held guilty of criminal negligence." (People v.
•·The following words were omitted from the inst~uction in the instant
case: ''even though his negligence does not amount to a wanton or
reckless disregard of human safety or life.''
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1

Driggs, at page 47.)

As '.Ve read the Pociask case which
approved the instruction given in Pcoz)le v. W·ilson, supra,
193 Cal. 512, which was almost* the same as that here given,
wherein it is said (p. 84), "Anything in the Driggs and
Hurley cases ineonsistrnt
must be deemed to be
disapproved,'' it appears that the requirement of wantonness,
flagrant or reckless disregard
the safety of others, or
wilful indifference, was deleted from the definition of criminal
negligenee or laek of due care and circumspection.
The law in California as to what constitutes "criminal
negligence'' or a lack of ''due caution and circumspection'' is
confused.
The cases of People v. D1·iggs, stLpra, 111 Cal.App. 42, and
People v. Hurley, snpra, 13 Cal.App.2d 208, which held that
some measure of wantonness or flagrant or reckless disregard
of the safety of others must enter into defendant's conduct
before he could be held guilty of criminal negligence, were
disapproved in People v. Pociask, supra. 'l'he Driggs case
involved assault with intent to commit murder; the Hurley
case involved death caused by the driving of an automobile.
The Pociask case which disapproved th<:'m involved the negligent driving of an automobile and the interpretation of a
statute (former section 500, Vehicle Code) which specifically
made criminal the negligent driving of a vehicle. The instruction in Pcopl e v. Wilson, S1tpra, 193 Cal. 512 (which is
substantially the same as the one here involved) was approved
by the Pociask case. 'l'he '\Vilson case was a manslaughter
conviction arising out of the negligent driving of a motor
vehicle. The court in the Pociask case, S1tpl'rt, comments on
the opinion of the Supreme Court in denying a hearing in
the case of
v. Sei~er, 57 Cal.App. 195 [207 P. 396],
wherein it vYas said: "The statute (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 2)
defines involuntary manslaughter of this specific character
as the unlawful killing of a human being, involuntarily,
but 'in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death . . . ·without due caution and circumspection.' In order
to constitute this kind of manslaughter the act may be lawful
but it must be one which might produc~e death, and which
does produce death, and it mnst be committed without due
caution and circumspection. The lack of due caution and
circumspeetion need not go to the extent of being ·wanton, or
reckless, although it might possibly be s11ch as would be defined as cnlpable.'' (Emphasis addrd.) In 1941 the negligent
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resulted because of an abortion and defendant was convicted
of manslaughter. It was noted that the deceased came to her
death by reason of the ''gross negligence'' of defendant and
his "negligence" and "careless and incompetent treatment."
In People v. Monteeino, 66 Cal.App.2d 85, 102 [152 P.2d
5], which involved the death of an elderly, bedridden woman
by reason of the brutal treatment and lack of care on the
part of defendant, the court held that ''it is established in
the State of California that involuntary manslaughter may
result even though the conduct of the offender is not wanton
or reckless. See comment by the Supreme Court in denying
a hearing in People v. Seiler (1922), 57 Cal.App. 195 [207
P. 396], . . . " The Seiler case, as heretofore noted, was
a negligent driving case.
In People v. Chavez, 77 Cal.App.2d 621, 628 [176 P.2d 92],
defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter because
she failed to use "due care" or "any of the care" necessary
for the welfare of her newborn baby. It was said: "While
it is conceivable that in some such cases the mental and
physical condition of a mother, at the time, might prevent her
from exercising that reasonable eare which would ordinarily
be required . . . '' that such was not the case at hand. (Emphasis added.)
In People v. Neff, 117 Cal.App.2d 772 [257 P.2d 47],
death occurred by reason of carbon monoxide escaping from
a badly vented gas heater. The court there cited the automobile-manslaughter cases, particularly People v. Pociask,
supra, 14 Cal.2d 679, and People v. Seiler, supra, 57 Cal.
App. 195, in discussing the instructions given. The following instruction was given there: "Due caution and circumspection, as those words are used in the instruction just given,
means such caution and circumspection as are reasonably
appropriate to avoid injury to one's self and others, under the
conditions at hand as they would be viewed by an ordinary
reasonable person in the same situation as the person whose
conduct is in question. To exercise due care and circumspection is to take those proper precautions which a person
of ordinary prudence would use in the same circumstances.
[ C ondttct does not need to am01lnt to wantonness or to recklessness to show and to constitute a lack of due care and
circumspection.] " The District Court of Appeal there held:
''The court should not have included in its instructions the
statement to the effect that a lack of due caution and circumspection need not amount to wantonness or recklessness.
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People's instruction No. 16, except for the statement therein
in brackets (to the effect that the conduct need not amount
to wantonness or recklessness), was a proper instruction.''
(P. 785.) This statement could mean an approval of former
decisions tbat ·wantonness or recklessness was necessary, or
just an attempt to satisfy former deeisions as they related to
vehicle-manslaughter.
In People v. Freudenbe1·g, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d 564,
580, v>here death resuJted from a firearm, the jury was held
properly instructed as follows: "The doing of an act ordinarily lawful which results in the death of a human being
may be manslaughter where the act, being one which might
cause death, is performed in an unlawful manner or without
due caution or circumspection. \Vhen a person is doing anything dangerous in itself or has charge of anything dangerous
in its use and acts with referenee thereto without taking
those proper precautions which a person of ordinary prudence
would have used under the circumstances, and the death of
another results therefrom, his act or neglect is a criminal act
against the person so killed even thmtgh his negligence does
not amount to a wanton or reckless disregard of human safety
or Uf e."* (Emphasis added.)
In People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 629 [258 P. 607], defectively constructed grandstands collapsed and a woman was
killed as a result thereof. \Nhilc very few facts appear in
the opinion, the court said: ''The prosecution of the appellant
was had under section 192 of the Penal Code, defining the
crime of manslaughter, and upon the theory that in the erection and construction of the stands the appellant did not
exercise due caution and circumspection. We deem it unnecessary to review the nea1·ly two thousand pages of testimony taken in the court below. It suffices to say that there
is evidence from which the jury might well conclude that the
grandstand which collapsed was so negligently constructed
as to be unable to carry the tremendous load placed upon it.''
(Emphasis added.) It would appear that in this particular
case, ''negligence'' and ''due caution and circumspeetion''
\Yere considered synonymous.
In People v. McGee, 31 Cal.2d 229, 238 [187 P.2d 706],
which involved a manslaughter conviction, it was held proper
to give the code definition of involuntary manslaughter (Pen.
Code, § 192, sub d. 2) beeause "If defendant, as he testified, discharged the pistol with intent only to frighten, and not to
*Emphasized portion is not found in instruction in present case.
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Two law review notes
seek to harmonize the
the Vehicle
written
to 1945 when the involuntary manslaughter
statute was enacted in its
form.
It is pointed out in 28 California Law Review 518, 519,
that a review of the available
of the half century
prior to 1872
section 20 o.f the Penal Code was enacted)
supports the conclusion that ''criminal
'' had a
common law
at that time which must be referred
to in determining the efreet of its inclusion in section 20.
'l'he English reports of the
reveal a well established
rule that gross
is necessary in criminal prosecutions, and that the term "criminal negligence" was used
along with many others to characterize the
of neglect
required. It is said that there was
to show that the
I1egislature intended to
section 192 of the Penal Code
from the operation of section 20 of the same code. In speaking
of
v.
14 Cal.2d 679
P.2d
, it was
noted that "having
of the defendant's argument by
holding that 'criminal
' was 11ot necessary under
section 500 of the V ehiele
it was not necessary for the
court to resolve the eonfiict between the Driggs and Hurley
cases,
an element of wantonness as contended by
defendant, and
cases holding· that deliberate disregard of the
of others is not necessary to a prosecution
for manslaughter; yet the court took the occasion to repudiate
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the two cases relied upon by defendant. Neither the previous
authority nor the principal case hold that civil negligence
is sufficient in manslaughter cases, but only that offered definitions of 'due caution and circumspection' were incorrect or
else did not add anything. Still other California cases, never
overruled, require a degree of negligence beyond that necessary to civil liability, so there is still room for doubt as to
how the court conceives 'criminal negligence' to be defined
in section 192.'' It is concluded that an instruction that a
defendant should not be convicted of manslaughter for the
usual lack of ordinary care would be much more favorable
to the defendant, more understandable and more in accord
with the established practice in most other jurisdictions
than the supposedly self-explanatory ''due caution and circumspection.''
In the other note (25 Cal.L.Rev. 1, 30) is found this statement: "The main question is, therefore, what does 'without
due caution and circumspection' mean; what degree of culpability is required~ The law on this point seems in California
to be less settled and less clear than in other jurisdictions.''
After quoting an instruction identical with the one in the
present case except for the words ''even though his negligence
does not amount to a wanton or reckless disregard of human
safety or life'' which are not present in our case, the writer
notes that ''It is not easy to understand the true significance
of this rule. Did the supreme court therein formulate the
proposition that ordinary (civil) negligence would suffice to
constitute manslaughter? Certainly California has widened the
concept of criminal negligence necessary to constitute manslaughter further than most of the other jurisdictions. But
it does not seem correct to say that the quoted passages from
People v. Seiler and People v. Wilson [both automobile-manslaughter cases] are authority for the proposition that the
negligence which suffices as the basis for civil liability and
the negligence which is the foundation for criminal liability
under the manslaughter statute are of the same degree. To
be sure the language of the court contains a term which is
customarily used in the definition of civil negligence, namely,
the following: 'precautions which a person of ordinary prudence could have used under the circumstances.' But as a
whole the definition differs from that of ordinary negligence,
including, as it does, the element of something dangerous in
itself or in its use. Furthermore, the court admitted in the
quoted passage from People v. Seiler that the lack of due
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caution and circumspection might be such as would be defined
as culpable, even though this word was not considered to be
a proper term to convey the significance of due caution and
circumspection. ''
In the two most recently filed civil liability cases before
this court (Jensen v. Jliinard, ante, p. 325 [282 P.2d 7] and
Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., ante, p. 310 [282 P.2d
12]) we were concerned with personal injuries occurring
because of the negligent handling of dangerous instrumentalities (a gun, and shooting gallery cartridges). \Ve concluded,
in both cases, that the standard of care in such cases was so
great that a slight deviation therefrom would constitute negligence. In the case at hand, the jury was instructed in part
that '' vVhen a person is doing anything dangerous in itself
or has charge of anything dangerous in its use and acts with
reference thereto without taking those proper precautions
which a person of ordinary prudence would have used under
the circumstances and the death of another results therefrom,
his act or neglect is a criminal act against the person so
killed." It appears that this instruction is the same principle
we have so recently applied in civil liability cases.
The statute (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 2) provides (in part)
that in order to convict a person of involuntary manslaughter,
there shall be an unlawful l~:illing of a human being in the
commission of a lawful act which might produce death without
due caution and circumspecton. The words lack of "due
caution and circumspection" have been heretofore held to
be the equivalent of "criminal negligence" (Pen. Code, § 20).
The general rule is set forth in 26 American Jurisprudence,
Homicide, section 210, page 299, as follows: "The authorities are agreed, in the absence of statutory regulations
denouncing certain acts as criminal, that in order to impose
criminal liability for a homicide caused by negligence, there
must be a higher degree of negligence than is required to
establish negligent default on a mere civil issue. The negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that
is, the conduct of the accused must be such a departure from
what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful
man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible
with a proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a
disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences.''
The article continues thus: ''Aside from the facts that a more
culpable degree of negligence is required in order to establish
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vehicle
homicide
\Yith a violation of section
cases. Defendant here
should have
192, subdivision 2, of the Penal Code. The
been instructed
to the rule ·which
prevails in this
as to what constitutes criminal negligence,
or lack of due caution and
so that her guilt
or innocence
be determined in accord therewith.
Because of the errors heretofore
the judgment is
reversed.

C. J.,

and Schauer,

concurred.

